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1 Introduction
With only a few exceptions, the existing literature is focused on the link between corporate
bonds and ESG factors (Oikonomou et al., 2012; Bauer and Hann, 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011;
Bauer et al., 2009; Godfrey et al., 2009). Relatively little is known about how sovereign bond
spreads are affected by environmental, social and governance concerns. One of the rare studies
in this area (Moret and Sagnier, 2013) compares the total return of bonds issued by countries
with high ESG scores (based on CO2 emissions per capita, the UNs Human Development
Index and other governance, social and environmental features) against a group with low
ESG scores. The authors find that bonds issued by the countries with high ESG scores
outperform those issued by countries with lower scores. An empirical framework describing
the ESG ratings of 78 countries for 2007 measured against the Fitch ratings, conducted by
MSCI (2011), documents a strong correlation between ESG factors and subsequent rating
downgrades. The study shows that countries with the largest discrepancies between financial
performance and ESG rankings are the most likely to be downgraded in subsequent years.
Our paper examines the relationship between the extra-financial characteristics of coun-
tries and the costs of their sovereign bonds. We consider these bonds at different maturities
(two, five and 10 years) because their costs may differ according to the time horizon (Afonso
et al., 2012).
We therefore state two working hypotheses.
Hypothesis H1: Higher ESG ratings are associated with lower borrowing costs.
Hypothesis H2: The positive effect of ESG ratings on borrowing costs decreases with
bonds maturities.
These two hypotheses are tested (using an instrumental variables fixed-effect panel re-
gression) over a data set of 23 countries from 2007 to 2012. We contribute to the empirical
literature on sovereign risk in two ways. First, we provide evidence that the ESG performance
of countries may impact sovereign bond markets. Second, we shed light on a new class of
country risk, ESG risk. Hence, extra-financial analysis which assesses this class of risk may
convey important signals about a country’s future credit risk.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the literature
review. Section 3 describes the data and variables. Section 4 presents the econometric model,
while section 5 gives the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
A common measure of a country’s borrowing cost in international capital markets is its yield
spread, which is defined as a market’s measure of a country’s risk of default. Prior literature
has argued that three types of potential determinants affect spreads (Attinasi et al., 2009;
Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009; Afonso et al., 2012): (1) A country’s creditworthiness as
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reflected by its fiscal and macroeconomic position, the so-called credit risk (Ardagna et al.,
2004; Afonso et al., 2012); (2) Liquidity risk, i.e. the size and depth of the government’s
bond market (Go`mez-Puig, 2006; Beber et al., 2008); and (3) International risk aversion, i.e.
investor sentiment towards this class of assets for each country (Codogno et al., 2003; Barrios
et al., 2009). Some researchers argue that in recent years, the weight of country specific
factors (i.e. country credit risk) has increased compared to the weights of liquidity factors
(Barrios et al., 2009; Codogno et al., 2003; Mody, 2009) and international factors (Haugh et
al., 2009; Barrios et al., 2009; Spencer and Liu, 2013).
From this perspective, an increasing number of studies now point out the role of macro-
economic conditions as explanatory variables of credit default risk. These studies try to
explain sovereign bond spreads by examining, for instance, the debt burden of countries
(Bernoth et al., 2012; Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012), openness and the terms of trade (Eichler
and Maltritz, 2013; Maltritz, 2012), and fiscal variables (Gruber and Kamin, 2012). Although
the evidence in this literature clearly suggests some empirical regularities, the debate on the
stable and significant determinants of sovereign bond spreads is far from settled.
An extension of these studies is the identification of country specific financial health as
a determinant of sovereign bond spreads (Mody, 2009; Sgherri and Zoli, 2009; Barrios et al.,
2009; Bellas et al., 2010). Mody (2009) for instance finds that financial sector vulnerabilities
(measured by the ratio of the country’s financial sector to the overall equity index) are
strongly correlated with spread changes in Euro area countries. He shows that the rescue
of Bear Stearns in March 2008 marked a turning point. Thereafter, a differentiation in
sovereign spreads across Eurozone countries emerged, caused mainly by differences in the
prospects of the domestic financial sectors. The differences widened in September 2008 (when
Lehman Brothers failed), as some countries paid an increased penalty for high public debt
to GDP ratios. Following this line, De Bruyckere et al. (2013) present evidence in favor of
interdependencies between the creditworthiness of sovereign countries and the vulnerability
of banks. Analyzing the risk spillovers between banks and countries and vice versa in Europe
during the period 2006-2011, the authors show that bilateral exposures between banks and
sovereign countries are relatively large and likely to induce risk spillovers.
Earlier researchers have also examined the effect of country political indicators on the
risk premia paid by governments relative to the benchmark government bond. Citron and
Nickelsburg (1987) observe that political instability is an important determinant of the prob-
ability of default. They construct an indicator of political instability that measures the
number of changes in government - accompanied by changes in policy - taking place within
the previous five years. They find that, on top of various macroeconomic indicators, their
measure of political instability has a significantly positive effect on the default probability.
Brewer and Rivoli (1990) confirm these results by using regime instability, which is proxied
by the changes in the head of government. Erb et al. (1996) present evidence showing the
significant performance of long strategies for bonds issued by governments with decreasing
political risk, and short strategies for bonds from governments with increasing political risk.
The political determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads have been of particular interest
to researchers. For example, Ebner (2009) documents significant differences in government
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bond spreads in Central and Eastern Europe during crisis and non-crisis periods, with po-
litical instability or uncertainty explaining the rise in spreads during crisis periods. Matei
and Chaptea (2012) show in a panel of observations for 25 EU countries from 2003 to 2010
that a country’s political risk perception is a significant predictor of sovereign spreads. They
also find that by looking at social and political factors, investors can build up a picture of
a country and better gauge the risks of investment. Eichler (2013) observes for a sample
of emerging countries that sovereign bond yield spreads are affected by a nation’s political
system. In particular, he observes that countries with parliamentary systems (as opposed to
presidential) face higher sovereign yield spreads. He also notes that improving the quality of
governance helps to reduce sovereign bond yield spreads.
Connolly (2007) investigates the links between sovereign bond spreads and corruption.
He finds that Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index downgraded the
creditworthiness of sovereign bonds by diverting loan proceeds from productive projects to less
productive ones, if not to offshore accounts. This suggests that efforts to make underwriting
sovereign bonds more transparent and less corrupt would improve credit ratings and by
implication lower the cost of sovereign borrowing. This is supported by Ciocchini et al.
(2003), who observe that countries perceived as more corrupt have to pay higher yields when
issuing bonds. Their study combines data on bonds traded in the global market with survey
data on corruption compiled by Transparency International. Similar findings are obtained by
another study (Union Investment, 2012): countries whose bond yields rose the most during
the Euro crisis, including Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy, experienced the largest increase
in their Corruption Perception Index between 2007 and 2012.
Margaretic and Pouget (2014) find that the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) en-
ables a better assessment of the expected value and the volatility of sovereign bond spreads
in emerging markets. Similarly, investigating the implications of different indicators of sus-
tainability performance of investment funds, Scholtens (2010) observes that the performance
of Dutch government bond funds differs according to the environmental indicator. He sug-
gests that funds should be very transparent and straightforward about their non-financial
performance.
3 Data and the determinants of Vigeo ESG ratings
3.1 Data
Our data set includes observations of 23 OECD countries from 2007 to 2012. It is constructed
from four sources:
• The Vigeo sustainability country rating database: Vigeo is the leading extra-financial
rating agency in the European Union. From the Vigeo sustainability country rating
database, we extract information about our main independent variable, the environ-
mental, social and governance (ESG) rating of our 23 countries.
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• The Thomson-Reuters Datastream database: We extract from this data set information
concerning the yield on sovereign bonds for our 23 countries (and the US) and the
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) ratings.
• The World Bank database: We extract two types of information from this database.
First, we take information concerning our control variables (GDP growth rate, inflation
rate, gross debt to GDP ratio, country fiscal balance to imports, reserves to imports
ratio, and trade openness ratio defined by imports and exports to GDP). Second, we
extract information about 15 variables used in our robustness analysis: Electricity gen-
eration, CO2 emissions, Forest rents per GDP, Protected areas as a percentage of na-
tional land area, Social expenditure per GDP, Female to male labor force participation
rate, Health expenditure per GDP, R&D expenditure per GDP, Human Development
Index, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, Government effectiveness, Political stability,
Voice and accountability, and Corruption control.
• The ISO database: We extract from this database our instrumental variable, the number
of ISO 14001 certified firms in each of our 23 countries.
3.2 The main independent variable: Vigeo country ESG ratings
Vigeo has assessed the sustainability performance of more than 170 countries from the anal-
ysis of more than 130 indicators (selected from international conventions and standards such
as the following: the Millennium Development Goals1, Agenda 212, the International Labour
Organization conventions, the United Nations Charters and Treaties, and the OECD Guid-
ing Principles for risk and ESG performance related to Environmental Protection, Social
Protection and Solidarity, and the Rule of Law and Governance (see table 1).
1These eight goals were established in 2000 by 189 countries as targets to be achieved by 2015.
2Agenda 21 on sustainable development was adopted by 179 countries in 1992 at the UN Earth Summit in
Rio de Janeiro.
6
Table 1: Dimensions of Vigeo Country ESG Ratings
Environmental responsibility





Air emissions Climate change
Ozone layer protection
Local and regional air quality
Water Measure of water withdrawal
Biodiversity Percentage of threatened species
Percentage of protected areas
Land use Proportion of land covered by forest
Changes in the proportion of forest
Environmental pressure Nuclear waste
Energy consumption measures
Institutional responsibility
Human rights Respect, protection and promotion of human rights
Respect, protection and promotion of labor rights
Democratic institutions Political freedom and stability measures
Control of corruption measures
Independence of justice measures
Market regulation measures
Press freedom measures
Social responsibility and solidarity
Social protection Inequality measures
Total unemployment
Youth unemployment
Education Public education expenditure
Primary school education enrollment
Secondary school education enrollment
Health Public health expenditure
Mortality (Infant mortality, life expectancy)
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate
Tuberculosis prevalence and death rates
Gender Equality Gender equality
Gender empowerment index
Development aid Development aid measures
Safety policy Participation in international conventions
Vigeo gathers only official data from institutions such as the World Bank, the United
Nations Development Program, the United Nations Environment Program, the United Na-
tions Office on Drugs and Crime, the United Nations Childrens Emergency Fund, the Food
and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, the International Labour Institute,
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Office of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights, Coface, Amnesty International, Transparency International,
Freedom House, and Reporters without Borders.
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Three annual ratings (the Environmental Responsibility Rating-ERR, the Social Respon-
sibility and Solidarity Rating-SRSR, and the Institutional Responsibility Rating-IRR) are
calculated by Vigeo, as well as a composite index. For each rating, Vigeo has selected sev-
eral criteria representing either commitments or quantitative realizations. For each criterion,
countries are rated on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (the best grade). For the commitment
criteria, i.e. the signature and ratification of treaties and conventions, the grade is as follows:
0 if the country has not signed, 50 if the country has signed but has not ratified, and 100 if the
country has signed and ratified. For the quantitative criteria, a score is computed following
the decile method: the 10 per cent of worst-performing countries obtain a score of 10, and so
on. Vigeo ranks not only levels but also trends computed as variation rates between the first
and the last available values. More precisely, if a country’s trend lies in the top 20 percent,
then it benefits from a premium of 10 points for the criterion at stake; if the country exhibits
a negative trend, it gets a 10-point penalty. The three annual ratings (ERR, SRSR, IRR) are
weighted averages of scores. The ESG global index is an equally-weighted average of these
three ratings. The advantage of using these Vigeo ratings comes from the wide spectrum of
criteria taken into account.
Table 2 (below) reports the descriptive statistics concerning the average Vigeo ESG ratings
from 2007 to 2012 for the 23 countries. The figures show a clear discrimination between good
and bad performers with respect to ESG criteria. For instance, the Scandinavian countries
(Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) obtain the best scores, and when looking at the
dispersion (standard-deviation) of each country’s ESG ratings over the period 2007-2012, one
can note that this dispersion ranges from 0.28 (Portugal) to 3.18 (Iceland).
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Table 2: Vigeo ESG country rating over the period 2007-2012
Country Vigeo ESG rating St.Dev. Min Max
Australia 75.15(a) 1.48 73.90 77.94
Austria 79.13 0.82 78.80 80.71
Belgium 75.79 0.85 74.55 77.12
Canada 71.87 1.00 70.59 73.24
Czech Republic 79.90 1.75 77.82 82.12
Denmark 81.92 0.52 81.19 82.57
Finland 83 0.41 82.51 83.66
France 78.18 0.83 76.99 79.12
Germany 79.41 1.29 77.64 81.09
Iceland 77.88 3.18 73.81 81.3
Ireland 77.23 0.95 75.66 78.34
Italy 72.37 0.99 70.67 73.6
Japan 71.46 2.71 67.4 75.24
Korea 68.71 1.54 67.21 71.52
Netherlands 80.46 0.75 79.67 81.82
New Zealand 74.69 1.91 71.5 77.03
Norway 86.96 1.30 85.05 88.71
Poland 78.07 0.81 77.03 79.23
Portugal 71.04 0.28 70.69 71.34
Spain 75.15 0.85 73.85 75.96
Sweden 86.50 0.67 85.2 87.07
Switzerland 81.91 0.68 80.85 83
United Kingdom 80.99 0.55 80.6 82.07
(a) = Mean Vigeo ESG rating for Australia over the period 2007-2012.
Regarding Figure 1, which plots Vigeo ESG average rating for all countries over the period
2007-2012, we notice three phases. Firstly, the average rating for all countries increases
between 2007 and 2008. Secondly this average rating continues to increase between 2008 and
2010 but at a more moderate rate. Finally, it decreases from 2010 to 2012.
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Figure 1: Average Vigeo ESG ratings for all countries over the period 2007-2012
3.3 The dependent variable: Sovereign borrowing cost
As a measure of sovereign borrowing cost, we use the bond yield spread of government.
The spread is defined as the difference between the interest rate the government pays on its
external US dollar-denominated debt and the rate offered by the US Treasury on a debt of
comparable maturity (Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010). More precisely, we consider yield on
sovereign bonds of the considered country minus yield on US sovereign bonds, both values
being taken at the end of year, from the yield curve for a fixed maturity. The yield on the
benchmark US Bond is then treated as the ”risk-free” rate or the numeraire over which each
country’s spreads are computed. We choose three comparable maturities: two years, five
years and 10 years.
Table 3 presents the distribution of mean bond spread by Vigeo ESG rating per country
over the period 2007-2012. It reveals two features. Firstly, it is obvious that countries well
rated on ESG criteria have low sovereign bond yield spreads. Secondly, for the bulk of
countries, longer maturity is associated with lower bond spreads.
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Table 3: Mean bond spreads by Vigeo ESG ratings, per country over the period 2007-2012
Bond spreads
Country Vigeo ESG rating two years five years 10 years
Australia 75.15 3.146 2.592 1.946
Austria 79.13 0.693 0.706 0.551
Belgium 75.79 0.912 0.932 0.848
Canada 71.87 0.647 0.364 0.028
Czech Republic 79.90 1.297 1.104 0.901
Denmark 81.92 0.662 0.326 0.091
Finland 83 0.366 0.308 0.276
France 78.18 0.345 0.090 -0.039
Germany 79.41 0.492 0.478 0.489
Iceland 77.88 6.473 5.642 4.985
Ireland 77.23 3.169 3.106 3.181
Italy 72.37 2.117 2.132 2.073
Japan 71.46 -0.730 -1.350 -1.688
Korea 68.71 2.864 2.303 1.659
Netherlands 80.46 0.291 0.296 0.220
New Zealand 74.69 3.155 2.797 2.245
Norway 86.96 1.348 0.958 0.600
Poland 78.07 3.910 3.363 2.720
Portugal 71.04 4.220 4.593 3.794
Spain 75.15 1.920 2.038 1.840
Sweden 86.50 0.809 0.472 -0.068
Switzerland 81.91 -0.252 -0.663 -1.131
United Kingdom 80.99 0.395 0.441 0.307
3.4 The control variables
In order to control for countries’ economic characteristics, our analysis includes variables
based on previous studies (Attinasi et al., 2009; Mody, 2009; Barbosa and Costa, 2010;
Afonso et al., 2012; D’Agostino and Ehrmann, 2013; Matei and Chaptea, 2012). We use
seven country specific controls:
1. The GDP growth rate. Research on the sustainability of a country’s debt reveal that
growing economies are more able to fulfil their financial obligations than stagnating
economies (Bernoth et al., 2012). We expect therefore a negative link between the
GDP growth rate and the spread of sovereign bonds.
2. Inflation rate. This reveals sustainable monetary and exchange rate policies. Higher
price differentials point to structural problems in a government’s finances. When the
government appears unable or unwilling to pay for current budgetary expenses through
taxes or debt issuance, it must resort to inflationary money finance. Public dissatisfac-
tion with inflation may in turn lead to political instability (Cantor and Packer, 1996),
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which could put upward pressure on government bond yields and thus the spreads could
widen. We expect therefore a positive link between the inflation rate and sovereign
bonds spread.
3. Gross debt to GDP ratio. Higher levels of debt are expected to increase the default risk
and, as a consequence, the yield spreads (Schuknecht et al., 2009).
4. Fiscal balance to GDP ratio. Governments running larger fiscal deficits are considered
less creditworthy and thus amplify the default risk (Attinasi et al., 2009; Sgherri and
Zoli, 2009; Gruber and Kamin, 2012). From this standpoint we may expect an increasing
fiscal balance to GDP ratio to lower the yield spread. However, another view is that
an increasing fiscal balance to GDP ratio may increase the yield spread. If agents
are forward looking, there may be some Ricardian equivalence, with private savings
increasing, as fiscal deficits increase, in anticipation of future tax hikes to fulfill the
intertemporal budget constraint. This may reduce the impact on bond yields. In other
words, lower fiscal deficits may increase sovereign bonds spread Baldacci and Kumar
(2010).
5. Reserves to imports ratio. This ratio is a liquidity ratio measuring the access to credit
relative to national reserves. According to the literature (Cartapanis, 2002), this ratio is
also a good indicator for the capacity of economies and central banks to face speculative
attacks. A higher ratio can decrease investors’ confidence in the economy and this could
be a sign of a banking crisis followed by a flight to quality. In turn, we may expect a
positive relationship between the reserves to imports ratio and sovereign bonds spread.
6. Trade openness. It is measured here by the ratio sum of exports and imports to GDP.
The literature (Ferrucci, 2003) shows that country openness plays an important role in
explaining economies’ costs of borrowing, as the penalty for sovereign default is higher
in terms of capital reversion in an open rather than a closed economy. The higher this
ratio, the greater is the ability of countries to generate the required trade surpluses in
order to refinance the present stock of debt or to finance new debt. We thus expect a
negative relationship between trade openness and sovereign bonds spread.
7. Sovereign credit ratings. This captures the government’s supposed ability to meet its
financial commitments. We measure it here by the S&P rating, which has been trans-
formed into a numerical variable, ranging from 1 (BB) to 11 (AAA). According to the
literature (Afonso et al., 2012), sovereign credit ratings are a determinant of sovereign
borrowing costs: higher sovereign ratings are associated with lower borrowing costs.
Table 4 includes the mean-distribution of our control variables.
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Table 4: Mean-Distribution of all variables
Variable Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Government Bond spread
two-year maturity 1.66 2.31 -2.32 15.25
five-year maturity 1.43 2.21 -2.41 16.14
10-year maturity 1.12 1.94 -2.54 11.68
Vigeo ESG rating(a) 77.75 4.85 67.21 88.71
∆GDP/GDP (b) 0.93 2.89 -8.54 6.78
∆P/P (c) 2.33 1.94 -2.75 12.40
G.GV.Debt/GDP (d) 66.02 41.53 -1.00 236.56
Fis./GDP (e) -2.64 5.72 -30.94 18.78
Reserves/Imports(f) 2.93 3.36 0.03 18.25
X + M/GDP (g) 85.54 36.43 25.02 188.9
S&P (h) 9.10 2.61 1 11
(a) = Our variable of interest: ESG country rating.
(b) = GDP growth.
(c) = Inflation rate.
(d) = Gross debt to GDP ratio.
(e) = Country’s fiscal balance to GDP.
(f) = Ratio of reserves to imports.
(g) = Trade openness ratio.
(h) = Standard & Poor’s: Numerical variable assigning 1 to BB, 2 to BB+ and so
on through 11 to AAA.
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix for our independent variables. We can note that
the correlation coefficients are not very high. This implies that our estimates will not suffer
from high colinearity between independent variables. As expected (Novethic, 2010), we find
a positive correlation (0.41) between the extra-financial rating (assessed by the Vigeo ESG
rating) and the financial rating (assessed by the S&P rating). Even if this figure is significant
(at 1%), it is not high. This suggests (Mora, 2006; Flannery et al., 2010) that financial ratings
(like the S&P rating) do not cover all aspects that explain governments’ financial credibility.
Hence, using both the S&P rating and Vigeo ESG rating within the same regression is
accurate.
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Table 5: Pearson correlation matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Vigeo ESG rating 1
2 ∆GDP/GDP -0.04 1
3 ∆P/P -0.005 0.15* 1
4 G.GV.Debt/GDP -0.32*** -0.23*** -0.2** 1
5 Fis./GDP 0.35*** 0.3*** 0.17** -0.39*** 1
6 Reserves/Imports -0.24** 0.008 -0.053 0.45*** 0.08 1
7 X + M/GDP 0.23*** 0.01 0.01 -0.11 -0.05 -0.34*** 1
8 S&P 0.41***(a) 0.02 -0.29*** -0.26*** 0.28*** -0.17** -0.03 1
(a) = Correlation coefficient between the S&P rating and the Vigeo ESG rating.
***,**,* significant respectively at 1%, 5%, 10%.
4 Estimating the effect of ESG ratings on countries’ borrow-
ing costs
4.1 Fixed effects model
Our data set is a panel data set that includes a group of 23 countries observed over a period
of six years. In order to take advantage of the structure of our data set, which includes both
a country dimension and a time dimension, we use a panel regression.
SPREADit = β0 + β1(V igeoESG)it + β2(
∆GDP
GDP )it + β3(
∆P
P )it + β4(
G.GV.Debt





Import )it + β7(
X+M
GDP )it + β8(S&P )it + αi + λt + uit
(1)
where i = 1 to n (the number of countries) and t = 1 to T (the number of periods).
The independent variables are respectively as follows: V igeoESG, the sustainability country
rating which is our variable of interest; ∆GDP/GDP , the GDP growth rate; ∆P/P , the
inflation rate; G.GV.Debt/GDP , the gross debt to GDP ratio; Fis/GDP , the country’s fiscal
balance to GDP; Reserves/Imports, the ratio of reserves to imports; (X + M)/GDP , the
trade openness ratio; and S&P, the Standard & Poor’s based numerical variable assigning
1 to BB rating, 2 to BB+, · · · , 11 to AAA. The dependent variable SPREADit is the
government bond spreads. In order to check whether the effect of the Vigeo ESG rating
depends on the bonds’ maturities (see hypothesis H2), we estimate our econometric model
for three maturities: two-years, five-years and 10-years bond spreads.
The residuals are εit = αi+λt+uit where αi represents the (unobserved) country specific
effect, λt represents the (unobserved) time specific effect, and uit represents a random error
term with V ar(uit) = σ
2
u and E(uit) = 0 whatever i, t. The country specific effect αi allows
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us to take into account unobservable variables that are specific to the country i and time-
invariant; while the time specific effect λt permits us to take into account unobservable shocks
that affect all countries indifferently. We use a (country and time) fixed effects panel model
where αi and λt are supposed to be certain. As a consequence, in a fixed effects model, the
αi and λt are (in addition to the parameters β0 · · ·β8) to be estimated. In order to identify
the model, only n − 1 of the αi, i = 1 · · ·n and T − 1 of the λt, t = 1 · · ·T , are included in
the regression. Our choice of a fixed effects model seems to be correct since the test for the
non-existence of fixed effects rejects the null hypothesis and concludes with the existence of
both country and time specific effects.
4.2 Endogeneity issue
However, one may wonder whether the Vigeo ESG rating is endogeneous. Endogeneity can
be the consequence of two main mechanisms: unobserved heterogeneity (omitted variables)
and simultaneity.
Unobservables, such as the abilities and preferences of the incumbent political administra-
tion, are likely to affect government ESG behavior (Eichholtz et al., 2012) but also government
bond spreads (Santiso, 2003; Moser, 2007). Since these variables are not included in the re-
gression, they will be de facto in the residuals εit. As a consequence, the Vigeo ESG rating
will be correlated to the residuals εit. However, since such abilities and preferences can be
seen as relatively constant over our period of time (2007-2012), they are already taken into
account in the country fixed effects. In other words, εit = αi + λt + uit and the Vigeo ESG
rating may be correlated with the αi, not with the uit. Since the αi are fixed, they are
explanatory variables of the model. Hence their eventual correlation with the Vigeo ESG
rating will have no influence on the estimates of the parameters (except if this correlation is
very high). Likewise, variables such as country wealth are taken into account in the country
fixed-effects. Concerning the simultaneity issue, the question is whether the sovereign debt
cost also affects the Vigeo ESG rating.
In order to take into account the potential endogeneity of the Vigeo ESG rating, we
instrument it with the number of ISO 14001 certified firms within the country3 using the
methodology of Wooldridge (2005):
1. For each time period t, we estimate the model:
V igeoESGi = a0 + a1(ISO)i + a2(
∆GDP
GDP )i + a3(
∆P
P )i + a4(
G.GV.Debt





Import )i + a7(
X+M
GDP )i + a8(S&P )i + vi
(2)
where vi represents a random error and ISOi is the number of ISO 14001 certified firms
within the country i.
2. Obtain the fitted values of V igeoESGit.
3The usual tests of instrument validity have, of course, been conducted.
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3. In model (1), replace V igeoESGit by its fitted values obtained in step 2. Then estimates
the resulting model.
4.3 The informational contents of the Vigeo ESG ratings
In this part we conduct a robustness check of the informational content of the Vigeo ESG
rating. Like its US counterpart KLD, Vigeo allows researchers to use its databases but does
not provide the formula it uses in order to obtain its ESG country ratings from the criteria
in table 1. We conduct the following actions to ascertain the informational contents of the
Vigeo ESG rating:
(a) We estimate the part of the Vigeo ESG rating that is explained by variables 4 like
Electricity generation, CO2 emissions, Forest rents per GDP, Protected areas as a
percentage of national land area, Social expenditure per GDP, Female to male labor
force participation rate, Health expenditure per GDP, R&D expenditure per GDP,
Human Development Index, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, Government effectiveness,
Political stability, Voice and accountability, and Corruption control. Let us called this
variable, Explained Vigeo ESG rating5. It is technically the predicted value of
the Vigeo ESG rating, when running for each time period t, an OLS regression where
the dependent variable is the Vigeo ESG rating and the independent variables are as
follows: Electricity generation, CO2 emissions, Forest rents per GDP, Protected areas as
a percentage of national land area, Social expenditure per GDP, Female to male labor
force participation rate, Health expenditure per GDP, R&D expenditure per GDP,
Human Development Index, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, Government effectiveness,
Political stability, Voice and accountability, and Corruption control.
(b) We estimate an instrumental variable fixed effects panel regression using the Explained
Vigeo ESG rating as the main independent variable. Of course, in this regression,
the Explained Vigeo ESG rating has been also instrumented using the number of
ISO 14001 certified firms within the country.
(c) If the parameter estimate associated with the Vigeo ESG rating (see table 6) is close
to the parameter estimate associated with Explained Vigeo ESG rating, then one
can conclude that the informational content of the Vigeo ESG rating is good.
5 Results and discussion
The results of the instrumental variables panel regressions are presented in Table 6. The
coefficient associated with the Vigeo ESG rating is negative and significant. Thus, in accor-
dance with our hypothesis H1, we find a negative correlation between the countries’ socially
4Such variables are used by rating agencies like KLD, CoreRatings, Deminor, Oekom. For an overview
see SustainAbility &Mistra (2004). See also (Hesse, 2006; Bassen et al., 2006; Margaretic and Pouget, 2014;
Martynova and Renneboog, 2010).
5This variable has exactly the same mean value (77.75) as the Vigeo ESG rating, with a standard-error of
4.61, a minimal value of 66.94, and a maximal value of 87.21.
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responsible performances and the sovereign borrowing cost (defined by the government bonds
spread). It seems therefore that countries displaying higher ESG indicators are rewarded by
lower sovereign borrowing costs. The results are economically relevant in the sense that they
could matter to both investors and national policy makers. Indeed, ESG ratings could play a
role in assessing risk and its location and distribution in the financial system. By facilitating
investment decisions, ESG assessments can help investors in achieving a balance in the risk
return profile and at the same time assist countries in accessing capital at a low cost (Kohut
and Beeching, 2013; Drut, 2010; Connolly, 2007).
Regarding bonds maturity, the result is qualitatively the same regardless of whether the
models are estimated with spreads of two years, five years or 10 years. However the magnitude
of the coefficients decreases (in absolute value) with the bond maturities: respectively -0.215
for two-year bond spreads, -0.179 for five-year bond spreads and -0.104 when considering
10-year bond spreads. This is also in accordance with hypothesis H2 and is in line with
previous studies findings that the financial effects of qualitative factors are more likely in the
short run. For instance, Bellas et al. (2010) find that, in the short run, financial fragility is
a more important determinant of spreads than fundamental indicators. According to these
authors, the short-term coefficient of the financial stress index appears to be highly significant
in all estimations, while the short-term coefficients of fundamental variables are less robust.
Particularly in the long run, sovereign bond spreads are primarily determined by debt and
debt-related variables, trade openness, and a set of risk-free rates. In the short run, the
degree of political risk, corruption, and financial stability in a country play the key role in
the valuation of sovereign debt. According to Zoli (2005) and Baig et al. (2006), fiscal policy
actions and announcements move bond markets in the short run.
Concerning our control variables, Inflation rate and Reserves to Imports ratio increase
sovereign borrowing costs, while S&P credit ratings, Gross debt to GDP ratio and the Fiscal
balance to GDP ratio lower borrowing costs. However, GDP growth rate and Trade openness
(defined by the ratio of Exports and Imports to GDP) seem to play no role in bond spreads.
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Table 6: Instrumental variables panel regression of bond spreads (with country and time
fixed effects)
Bond Spreads
2 two years 5 five years 10 years
Intercept 24.107*** 22.91*** 15.912***
(7.316)(s) (6.602) (4.811)
Instrumented Vigeo ESG rating(a) -0.215** -0.179* -0.104*
(0.092) (0.083) (0.061)
∆GDP/GDP (b) -0.025 -0.049 -0.008
(0.097) (0.088) (0.064)
∆P/P (c) 0.376*** 0.237** 0.136*
(0.122) (0.110) (0.080)
G.GV.Debt/GDP (d) -0.025* -0.022* -0.011
(0.014) (0.013) (0.009)
Fis./GDP (e) -0.02** -0.018** -0.012**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
Reserves/Imports(f) 0.627*** 0.541*** 0.364***
(0.143) (0.129) (0.094)
X + M/GDP (g) -0.025 -0.021 -0.011
(0.017) (0.015) (0.011)
S&P (h) -0.611*** -0.655*** -0.637**
(0.168) (0.151) (0.11)
R2 70.04 73.9 82.03
F-Test for no fixed effects 2.86*** 3.3*** 4.65***
***,**,* significant respectively at 1%, 5%, 10%
(a) = Instrumented by the number of ISO 14001 certified firms.
(b) = GDP growth.
(c) = Inflation rate.
(d) = Gross debt to GDP ratio.
(e) = Country’s fiscal balance to GDP.
(f) = Ratio of reserves to imports.
(g) = Trade openness ratio.
(h) = Standard & Poor’s: Numerical variable assigning 1 to BB, 2 to BB+ and so on
through 11 to AAA.
(s) = Standard-error.
Table 7 shows that the informational contents of the Vigeo ESG rating are actually very
good. Indeed, the coefficients associated with Explained Vigeo ESG rating in table 7 and
those associated with Vigeo ESG rating in table 6 are close. For instance, for bonds with
two-year maturity, the coefficients are −0.210 and −0.215 respectively.
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Table 7: Instrumental variables panel regression of bond spreads (with country and time
fixed effects) using Explained Vigeo ESG rating as main independent variable
Bond Spreads
2 two years 5 five years 10 years
Intercept 23.156*** 23.215*** 15.911***
(7.335)(s) (6.591) (4.809)
Instrumented Explained Vigeo ESG rating (a)(a’) -0.210** -0.191** -0.108*
(0.096) (0.098) (0.063)
∆GDP/GDP (b) -0.024 -0.054 -0.01
(0.098) (0.088) (0.064)
∆P/P (c) 0.391*** 0.263** 0.15*
(0.126) (0.113) (0.082)
G.GV.Debt/GDP (d) -0.02 -0.018 -0.009
(0.014) (0.013) (0.009)
Fis./GDP (e) -0.019** -0.017** -0.011**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
Reserves/Imports(f) 0.599*** 0.515*** 0.349***
(0.144) (0.129) (0.094)
X + M/GDP (g) -0.025 -0.022 -0.012
(0.017) (0.015) (0.011)
S&P (h) -0.508*** -0.631*** -0.625**
(0.172) (0.154) (0.112)
R2 70.26 73.96 82.03
F-Test for no fixed effects 2.87*** 3.34*** 4.66***
***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively
(a) Explained Vigeo ESG rating = The part of Vigeo ESG rating explained by: Electricity generation,
CO2 emissions, Forest rents per GDP, Protected areas as a percentage of national land area,
Social expenditure per GDP, Female to male labor force participation rate, Health expenditure
per GDP, R&D expenditure per GDP, Human Development Index, Regulatory quality, Rule of law,
Government effectiveness, Political stability, Voice and accountability, and Corruption control.
(a’) Instrumented by the number of ISO 14001 certified firms.
(b) = GDP growth.
(c) = Inflation rate.
(d) = Gross debt to GDP ratio.
(e) = Country’s fiscal balance to GDP.
(f) = Ratio of reserves to imports.
(g) = Trade openness ratio.




Sustainability has been gaining momentum in recent years at the country level, if not within
the academic finance community. This paper contributes to the literature by examining the
impact of government ESG performance on public debt using sovereign bond spreads as the
vehicle for measuring the cost of sovereign borrowing. To do so, we have collected information
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concerning several quantitative and qualitative variables for 23 OECD countries, from 2007
to 2012. We have used Vigeo sustainability country ratings to assess the ESG performance of
those countries. With this panel data, we have aimed at measuring empirically the effect of
extra-financial ratings on government bond spreads. Our results show that high ESG ratings
are associated with low borrowing costs. We also find that the impact of ESG indicators on
the costs of sovereign borrowings is more pronounced in bonds of shorter maturities. Hence,
extra-financial ratings play, from the standpoint of investors, an important role in assessing
risk in the financial system.
However the risk assessment story is not the only one that could explain why high ESG
ratings are associated with low borrowing costs for countries. For instance, one may argue,
in an analogy with the literature on intrinsic motivation (Frey, 1997; Benabou and Tirole,
2003; Besley and Ghatak, 2005), that some values-oriented investors accept to be paid a lower
risk premium from ESG-oriented countries. This happens not only because of their common
values, but also because the alignment of objectives of both parties will reduce the monitor-
ing cost of investors. Another explanation of the link between ESG ratings and countries’
borrowing costs can be found (remembering that the environment is one dimension of ESG)
in the EE-IS-LM model (Heyes, 2000; Sim, 2006; Decker and Woher, 2012). According to this
model, an upgrading of environmental standards is beneficial in the long run for economic
growth (and hence reduces the yield spread).
Our paper suggests some directions for future research. One direction could be to extend
our analysis over more time periods; another could be to focus on emerging economies and
developing countries, where the sovereign bond markets are different.
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